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ATOTALBUDGETMETHODOLOGY 
FOR ANALYZING INTERDISTRICT EQUITY 
OF STATE EDUCATIONAL FINANCE SYSTEMS 
WITH AN APPLICATION TO NEBRASKA 
F. Gregory Hayden 
Associate Professor of Economics 
Liniversity of Nebraska-Lincoln 
As in most states today, serious legislative concern is being given to 
elementary and secondary educational finance reform in Nebraska.' Also 
as in most states, Nebraska's main reform concern is the equity of 
fiscal distributions among school districts. Although, as anyone who has 
attempted to keep up with court decisions regarding educational finance 
knows,' equity is an elusive enough concept in the abstract and even more 
so when applied in the concrete. In general, though, the concern with 
regard to school finance is one of interdistrict equity. Using recent deci- 
sions as the criteria for judgment, the results of this study indicate that 
the Nebraska state school finance system is inequitable. The methodology 
articulated in this article with regard to interdistrict equity in Nebraska 
found that: 
1. The state system of financing schools is not an equalization system. 
In fact, it has just the opposite effect: it taxes the poor districts to 
provide school funds to the wealthy districts. Poor districts are made 
worse off because of the state financing system. 
2. Even the one term in the state formula which is labeled an "equal- 
ization" term does not equalize. 
3. Many formula terms are added to all districts' budgets by one statute 
and subtracted from all districts' budgets by another statute, thereby 
serving only to confuse. 
4. In the final analysis, state Foundation Aid goes only to  the more 
wealthy districts; the least wealthy receive no Foundation Aid. 
5. N1 the monies from the original land grant set-aside for schools go 
to  the more wealthy districts and none to the poorest districts. 
' See Allan Odden, School Finance Reform in the States: 1978, Report No. F78-1 
(Denver: Education Commission of the States, 1978). 
'see Betsy Levin, "New Legal Challengers in Educational Finance," Journal o f  
Educution Finance 3, No. 1 (1977). 
Nebraska Journal of Economics & Business 18:4 (Autumn 1979), pp. 5-25. 
6. When the legislature does not fully fund the state education formula, 
the burden of underfunding falls more heavily on the low-wealth 
districts than on the rich. 
7. Although courts have ruled that the community burden of other 
governmental services should be taken into consideration in deter- 
mining a school district's tax burden, this is not done in the Nebraska 
system. 
8. The underassessment of property, as measured by the sales-assessment 
ratio, is much greater for rich than for poor districts. 
9. The greater the per-student assessed wealth of the district, the less 
are the income and sales taxes paid to the state for the support of 
education. 
10. The greater the state exempted property-tax-replacement payments 
for schools, the greater is the assessed valuation of the district. This 
is a large benefit t o  rich schools. 
These conclusions are a result of a new methodology which is explained 
below. 
The methodology which has been used in past studies regarding educa- 
tional finance equity has been to look at  only a reduced aspect of the total 
fiscal pattern. For example, the distributional equity of funds from the 
Foundation Aid may be assessed, or the equity of the property tax may be 
assessed. These approaches fail to look at  the total finance system, how- 
ever. Before interdistrict equity can be determined, it is necessary to use a 
total budget approach which includes both the receipts a district gets from 
the state and the taxes a district pays to  the state. Only through a total 
budget approach can it be understood that some districts will be net gain- 
ers and others net losers, depending on their relationship to  the state 
system. To finance the system, the amount received by the gainers will 
equal the amount received by the losers and the total state budget at the 
end of the year is zero. Once the districts' net fiscal positions are deter- 
mined, these can be related to their wealth positions to determine equity. 
Such an approach has never previously been completed, and the purpose 
here was to prepare a total budget approach for Nebraska by starting with 
statutes and tracing through these statutes' fiscal impacts on the districts. 
The procedure followed in articulating the new methodology was as 
follows: 
1. A search was made to find all the state statutes which govern the 
flow of funds to school districts and the taxes mandated from the 
districts. 
2. The second step was to  trace the administration of the formula 
through the relevant state agencies and become cognizant of admin- 
istrative procedures which affect fund flow. 
3. The next step was to  design a total formula (see Table 1) which could 
be used to  determine the net position of the districts. 
4. The final step was to  collect the data, the complexity of which 
requires presenting only the source, method of computation, and 
regression results in footnote form below. 
The methodology is explained through an application to Nebraska by 
the use of both algebraic formulation and a graphing of the formula. Each 
part of the formula is explained and graphed separately. The same number 
used to  designate the term will follow the heading name of each term, and 
will appear before the formula describing the term and in Table 1. The 
curve for each new term described is added to the one previously described 
in order to  arrive a t  a system summary, which is graphed in summary form 
in Figure 17. The same letter is used to designate the same curve in the 
separate graphs and in Figures 17 and 18. The total algebraic formula is 
displayed in Table 1, along with legal references and definitions for the 
symbols used. Finally, Figure 18 indicates the final shape of the finance 
system with regard to  which districts pay and which receive. This shows 
what kinds of districts are net losers and what kinds are net gainers with 
regard to  wealth in the district. 
The graph format used in the explanation can be seen in Figure 1. The 
axes, which are on a per-pupil basis, indicate the total budget approach. 
The vertical axis represents the funds taken from or provided t o  a district, 
and the horizontal axis is the assessed property valuation of each district 
per Average Daily Membership (A.D.M.). The negative portion of the 
vertical axis indicates funds mandated from the district and the positive 
portion indicates funds paid to the district. 
+" 
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The names applied to each term in the formula are not always the same 
as those used by the Nebraska State Department of Education or in the 
statute. The attempt made here is to use names that are as descriptive as 
possible. For example, the nomenclature "equalizatio~" is not used be- 
cause there is no equalization term in the formula. Equalization is a name 
frequently used in Nebraska to designate the tax levy that is applied to all 
districts, but that is not equalization because nothing is being equalized. 
The same tax rate which is applied to  all will leave the districts in their 
original relative position. For there to be equalization, wealth, expendi- 
tures, need, or something else must be made more nearly equal. 
Negative Equal Rate Levy (1) 
Each kindergarten through twelfth grade (K-12) district in the Nebraska 
system is mandated, if it is to participate fully in the state system, to  pro- 
vide to  the state fund twelve mills of each dollar of local assessed property 
valuation regardless of the number of children it has to educate. Or, in 
terms of the formula: 
(1) - (0.012) (Assessed Valuation). 
If this is divided by the A.D.M. it can be depicted graphically by a straight 
line curve A '  in Figure 2, because each district is paying the same percent- 
age of its assessed value (this does not mean equal tax effort). Thus, the 
same percentage (0.012) applied to larger assessed valuations is indicated 
by a larger deficit as the districts' valuations increase. 
Deficit 
- $ 
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In some years Nebraska does not fully fund this portion of the formula. 
For example, in 1975-76 the state financed (collected) only 62  percent of 
it.j  This reduced the amount paid in by 38 percent and affected the 
formula as: 
3 ~ .  Cale Hudson, Understanding Public School Finance (Lincoln: Bureau of Edu- 
cational Research, University of Nebraska, 1977), pp. 29-30. 
- (.62) (0.012) (Assessed Valuation). 
This can be effected graphically by the shift from A' to A in Figure 3. 
Now it is obvious that underfunding is to the advantage of those districts 
with the greater assessed valuation. 
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For example, a district with $6,000 per pupil assessed valuation would 
gain $27.36 per student, while a district with $12,000 would gain $%.72 
per student. Since underfunding can occur at  any time, line A is used as 
the relevant curve from which to introduce additional changes. 
A note may be in order regarding underfunding. It occurs when the 
legislature does not fully utilize what is required by the formula, or, 
stated differently, does not provide enough funds to provide what the 
formula prescribes for each district. In Table 1 all of the terms affected 
by this shortfall are ind i~a ted .~  If there is to be underfunding, low assessed 
valuation districts would be treated more equally by spreading the under- 
funding equally among all students, rather than on an equal percentage 
basis which favors (see Figure 3) the high valuation district. 
One could also indicate the underassessment of property valuation. This 
would be shown by a similar additional pivot in curve A upward, because 
the richer districts underassess by a greater amount than the poor districts.' 
40f course, as will be seen later, if the legislature drastically underfunded the 
formula, even more terms would be affected. However, given the priority for under- 
funding and given the traditional levels of underfunding, those terms in Table 1 are 
the ones affected. 
 he assessed valuation figures can be found in the annual Statistics and Facts 
about Nebraska Schools. To fund the degree of underassessment, the assessed valu- 
ation was adjusted by the aseessment sales ratio provided by the Department of 
Revenue, Property Tax Division Reports. The difference between the adjusted prop- 
erty valuation and the original aaseseed valuation was then correlated with the original. 
The Pearson correlation between the two is ,90939 and is significant at the 99 percent 
iyegative Flat Foundation /Lid ( 2 )  
A term equal to  $17.50 for each kindergarten child, $35 for each child 
in grades 1-6, $42 for each child in grades 7-8 ,  and $49 for each child in 
grades 9-12 must be contributed by each district regardless of wealth. If 
N2 indicates the A.D.M. in kindergarten, N3 the A.D.M. in grades 1-6, and 
so on, then the term reads: 
(2) - [17 .50(N2)  + 35(N3)  + 42(N,)  + 4 9 ( N , ) ] .  
Since this is not affected by the wealth in the district, if an equal mix of 
different students in all districts is assumed, it can be depicted graphically 
with line B (Figure 4 )  by shifting down from line A by approximately 
$36.00 for all assessed valuation levels. 
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Negative Accountable Receipts ( 3 )  
The Accountable Receipts are equal to  the nonresident high school 
tuition, plus city and county fines and license fees, state apportionment, 
and the insurance premiums tax. State apportionment is by far the most 
important of these. I t  is provided by income derived from the original land 
grant set-aside for school support. State apportionment is ~ rov ided  to  the 
school districts in proportion to  the number of pupils 5-18 years of age in 
the district. Each district, regardless of wealth, must contribute its Ac- 
countable Receipts t o  the school fund;  therefore, apportionment can be 
level. This indicates that the greater the property value, the greater the under- 
assessment. If the assessed valuation is increased according to the assessment sales 
ratio, it has a great impact on the levy term. If assessed valuation is adjusted with 
the assessment sales ratio and if the levy term is considered alone, the adjustment 
would cause some districts to lose approximately $2,000 per student and other 
districts to gain approximately $500. But it should be pointed out that rich districts 
also lose funds in other terms by underassessing. 
represented by line C which is represented by $1 10  per A.D.M., the average 
amount in 1975-76. 
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After the districts' deficits have been created through contributions to 
the state fund, elements may be accounted for by moving the curve up- 
ward to determine how much each will finally receive. 
Positive Accountable Receipts ( 4 )  
After each district contributes its Accountable Receipts, this amount is 
returned to the district on the same basis as it was contributed. Therefore, 
this term has no effect on wealth, tax effort, or need. The effect of this, 
graphically, is t o  move the district back up to line B from line C on 
Figure 5. 
Positive Flat Foundation Aid ( 5 )  
The foundation aid [see description in (2) above] that each district 
contributed to the fund is paid out to the district. Therefore, like the 
Accountable Receipts, it has no effect on the outcome of the district re- 
ceipts. The negatives of these two simply cancel the positive, and terms 
2, 3, 4, and 5  in Table 1 could be eliminated, when there is full funding, 
without affecting the final outcome. Graphically, the district is now back 
up to line A in Figure 3. 
Positive Flat Grant ( 6 )  
The flat grant is added on the basis of A.D.M. in the different grade 
levels. Once again, using the symbols as defined above [see (2)], the 
formula provides for flat grants as: 
( 6 )  + [ 2 2 5 ( N , )  + 4 5 0 ( N , )  + 5 0 0 ( N , )  + 5 5 0 ( N , ) ] .  
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Since this is added without reference to  wealth or tax effort, it  can be 
depicted, once again assuming the same mix of students in all districts, by 
simply adding $500 at all wealth levels to  line A (Figure 6). Now it can be 
seen from curve D that if there were no additional terms in the formula, 
low valuation districts would be paid the distance from the horizontal axis 
to  line D and high valuation districts would be required to  pay into the 
fund the negative distance to  line D in order to  provide the funds for the 
less wealthy. This is not the end of the formula, however. 
Positive Added Flat Grant (7) 
Under Legislative Bill 984, each district is provided an additional flat 
&rant equal to approximately $32 per student, or: 
( 7 )  + [32(Ni ) 1. 
This is depicted by line E (Figure 7). 
There are three terms (8), (9), and (lo), to cover special costs which 
are added on when they apply: 
Positive Popuhtion Density Compensation (8) 
When the population in any county is less than four persons per square 
mile, the financial support of the flat grant is increased: by 10 percent if 
the population is between 3 and 4 persons per square mile, 20 percent if 
the density is between 2 and 3,30 percent if between 1 and 2, and 40 per- 
cent if less than one person per square mile. For example, if 20 percent 
is appropriate, the term would read: 
(8) + .20[225(N2) + 450(N,) + 500(N4) + 550(N5)]. 
Positive Increased Membership Compensation (9) 
Under this term each district is paid the percent of yearly increase in 
A.D.M. times the flat grant if the increase is greater than one-half of one 
percent (.005). Assuming a 2 percent increase, the term would read: 
(9) + .02 [225(N2) + 450(N,) + 500(N4) + 500(N,) 1. 
Positive Transportation Compensation (10) 
Each student in the school district residing more than four miles from 
school is eligible to  receive 25 percent additional flat pant .  If these students 
are designated a t  the various grade levels by N , ,  through N ,  ,, then: 
(10) +.25[225(N1,) + 45O(Nl5) + 500(N1,) + 550(N,,)]. 
The Positive Compensation to  cover special costs is represented by line 
F, which indicates that it does not vary by level of assessed valuation per 
student (Figure 8). 
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Positive Incentive Terms (ll), (12), (13), and (14) 
The state formula provides for a number of incentive programs, terms 
(11)-(14), in which the school district may participate if it  can afford to: 
Positive Degree lncentive (11) 
This is the degree incentive in which districts are paid extra depending 
on the number of doctoral, masters, and bachelor degree holders they have 
on their staff. The term reads: 
(11) + [$350(Ph.D.) + $250(M.A.) + $150(B.A.)]. 
Positive Deprived-Student Incentive (12) 
Another incentive is offered for the number of culturally and educa- 
tionally deprived pupils who are in approved programs. This term provides 
the district with an amount equal to  the flat grant for a child in the pro- 
gram, or: 
(12) t[225(Nl,)+450(Nll)+500(Nl,)+550(N,,)]. 
Positive Gifted-Pupil Incentive (13) 
The gifted-pupil incentive offers a reward of 25 percent additional funds 
over the flat grant payment for each gifted child, or: 
(13) + .25[225(N,,) + 450(N1,) t 500(N1,) + 550(N1,)]. 
Positive Summer School Incentive (14) 
The summer school incentive is determined on the basis of $18 per 
A.D.M. in summer school, or: 
( 1 4 )  + 1 8 ( N , ) .  
Line G indicates the incentive add-on. The distance between F and G 
is much greater a t  the high assessed valuation end than a t  the low one, 
which means a greater payment to  the rich districts. This indicates why 
educators have traditionally opposed incentive terms in distribution for- 
mulae. The wealthy districts can afford to  take advantage of the incentive, 
whereas other districts cannot. This changes the shape of the overall func- 
tion and reduces the return per student of poor districts as compared to 
rich districts, even though the original slope was established by an equal 
tax rate levied on all districts. It seems most unfair when the incentive 
approach is used with regard to culturally and educationally deprived. Poor 
districts, which usually will have the most use for such funds, will not be 
able t o  afford them. Of course, this perverse effect is lessened, the greater 
the incentive offered. 
Note that curve G is only representative and does not indicate the 
situation correctly for all districts, because some high assessed valuation 
districts do not choose to  receive any of some incentive program monies. 
Another issue related to  incentive terms is that of overburden. The 
courts continue to  rule that the community burden of other governmental 
services must be taken into consideration in determining a local district's 
school burden. For example, a district may appear to  have a high fiscal 
capacity per student, but it may also have many other commitments. This 
is sometimes referred to  as "municipal overburden," but can also apply to  
rural areas which might have excessive expenditures. These overburdened 
districts also get hurt because they cannot afford incentive grants-in-aid. 
Positive Payment for High Assessed Valuation Districts and 
Positive Foundation Aid and Accountable Receipts for 
High Assessed Valuation Districts (15) 
Positive Payment At this point it can be seen from Figure 9 that 
there are still somyhigh assessed valuation districts that would be required 
to pay into the fund without receiving state aid and therefore help equalize 
the cost of education. This is not done, however. Instead, these districts 
receive a payment equal to the distance between curve G and the hori- 
zontal axis. The districts to the right of point X in Figure 10 receive this 
aid and those to the left of X do not receive it. This subsidy to cover their 
deficit moves the curve to WXH. 
Figure I 0  
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Positive Foundation Aid At this point, the rich districts again receive 
Foundation Aid [described in (2) and (5) above], which the other districts 
do not receive again. Recall that all districts were credited with Foundation 
Aid and all paid it back into the state fund (line B, Figure 4). Now only 
the districts to the right of point Y (Figure 11) receive it again. These 
districts receive it twice, even though all districts pay an equal mill levy. 
I Figure I I 
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If the formula were summed at this point, it would provide the amount 
shown on the "Nebraska State Department of Education Worksheet." 
Positive Accountable Receipts In a similar manner, Accountable Re- 
ceipts are added for the wealthy districts. Recall that all districts received 
their Accountable Receipts, and all paid this amount into the fund (line C, 
Figure 5). Now Accountable Receipts are added again only for those 
ciistricts to  the right of point Z in Figure 12. It can be seen from Figure 11 
that the equal rate levy has very little effect on the final outcome of the 
district payments. 
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The term in the formula for the special payment to  high assessed valu- 
ation districts is: 
(15) + [(Foundation Aid + Accountable Receipts) - (Sum of terms 
1 through 14) 1, 
with the stipulation that the term is ignored if it is negative. The term will 
be negative when line G is greater than the level of line J (to the left of 
Z). Or stated differently, it will be negative when the assessed valuation is 
low. It will be positive for any district to  the right of point X. For any 
district t o  the right of Z but to the left of X, it  is a positive subsidy, but 
less than the Foundation Aid plus the Accountable Receipts. As the district 
is situated to  the right of point X along curve G, the subsidy is greater than 
the Foundation Aid plus the Accountable Receipts. 
Many discussions regarding Nebraska state education systems stop at 
this point. This is one of the reasons for the often-repeated claim that only 
a small percentage of the Nebraska system is financed from state sources. 
In fact, however, due t o  the personal property exemption, approximately 
40 percent of the educational expenditures comes from the state. 
If the analysis stopped here, it can be seen from curve WZJ that all 
districts would receive a positive payment, or have a net surplus. Rut that 
is not possible; some districts have to  pay, or incur a net deficit. Therefore, 
sales and income taxes used to pay for the receipts must be considered, 
and this is done in conjunction with the personal property exemption. 
Property Tax Replaceme~~t and Sales and lncome Taxes (16) (17) 
In addition to  the sales and income taxes used to  pay for the above, 
additional education funds comc from the state sales and income taxes 
paid to local districts to  replace property taxes lost through the homestead 
exemption and personal property exemption. Consistent with the long-term 
national trend, the property tax is becoming less important for Nebraska 
local governments. One means through which local governments are using 
the sales and income tax is through the state government paying local 
governments the amount they would be receiving if they were taxing 
exempted property at their current mill levy. The property exempted by 
state law includes homesteads and business-related property, such as inven- 
tories, grain supplies, and the like. This source of local funding is growing 
rapidly and will continue to do so in the future. A large percentage of this 
tax source is used by school districts lor financing education. Because it is 
usually included under the heading of local sources in published data, 
researchers get the idea that it is from the property tax. Since it is a ma- 
jor source of funding, it must be considered in this formulation consistent 
with its actual source and disposition. If the local property tax rate is 
represented by tp, then the term would read: 
(16) + tp (Assessed Valuation of Exempted Property). 
Therefore, the greater the assessed valuation of the district, the greater 
the funds received by the d i ~ t r i c t . ~  This is depicted graphically by line K 
in Figure 13. 
6 ~ h e  Pearson correlation between the two is .65279 and is significant at .00001. 
The assessed valuation for the districts is found in the annual Statistics and Facts 
[181 
The sales and income tax payment, also depicted in Figure 13, is below 
the horizontal axis because it is taken from the district. As indicated by L, 
there is an inverse relationship between sales and income taxes paid and 
the assessed valuation in the d i ~ t r i c t . ~  The "common sense" view is that 
income and sales taxes should be positively correlated with property values. 
However, as Albert Einstein pointed out long ago, the use of intuition and 
common sense have been a serious hindrance to scientific advance. Com- 
mon sense is simply an expression of the common thought of the day, and 
if we could depend on conventional wisdom, there would be no reason for 
scientific or empirical work. Those familiar with either the work of John 
R. Commons or with the public finances of Nebraska are aware that there 
is no iron law of economics defining either income or property, or the 
relationship between them. As Commons clarified in his Legal Foundations 
of Capitalism, property and income are both legal intangibles.' There is no 
reason to expect a priori that the separate legal definitions should follow 
the same legal channel. In Nebraska, those with the highest per student 
assessed property values, that is, farmers and ranchers, have a low cash in- 
come relative to other groups with similar property values. Thus their sales 
tax payments will be low. Those with high property values, especially 
farmers and ranchers, also are those with the greatest income tax deduc- 
tions relative to others with similar incomes. Thus their income tax pay- 
ments will be low. Therefore, the kind of results depicted in Figure 13 
might be expected. 
The main interest at  this point is the net result of K and L. If the two 
are compared, it can be seen that the negative tax payment of the low 
assessed value districts is greater than the receipts of those districts. As the 
assessed valuation increases, the district's net position improves, because 
receipts are growing and tax payments are decreasing. The net result of 
this is depicted in Figure 14 by curve M. 
about Nebrash Schools. However, the funds received to replace exempted property 
taxes is not published. The author compiled them from the original county report: 
the "Nebraska Department of Revenue Schedule VII-City and Village Schools Taxes 
Levied-Form 49." 
7 The Pearson correlation coefficient is -.26251 with significance of .00551. The 
correlation does not have a hlgh predictive value for any individual district, but it 
does show a definite inverse relationship as indicated by curve L. Since income and 
sales taxes paid are not available by school district, county data are used. They are 
available in the Nebraska Department of Revenue Annual Report. 
~ o h n  R. Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1957). 
Now if curve M is added to  WZJ of Figure 12, the final result-curve :V 
- 
of Figure 15-of state financing is attained. The negative curve M over- 
whelms WZJ for the low assessed valuation districts and gives them a net 
deficit position, or, stated differently, they pay the taxes to  support the 
system. Curve M will continue to  subtract from WZJ until M bec;mes zero 
(point m o )  At that point N will equal WZJ. Beyond that point the posi- 
tion level of M will continue to  add onto WZJ. Curve N indicates the final 
result of state-level financing and taxation with the low assessed valuation 
districts paying for the program and the high assessed valuation districts 
receiving the funds. 
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Local Financing 
Although this article pertains to the state funding system, it is interesting 
to  note the result of adding local funding onto what has been found re- 
garding the statc: system. The Nebraska system allows local districts to 
spend additional funds beyond those provided by the state. This term can 
be expressed as the local tax rate times the assessed valuation, or: 
(18) tp (Assessed Property Valuation). 
The effect of this term is shown by line 0 in Figure 16 with the local ex- 
penditures being greater the higher the assessed valuation: 
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By adding curve 0 to curve N, P i s  attained, as depicted in Figure 18. The 
distance between N and P is the total cost to  the district, while the 
distance between P and the horizontal axis is the total receipts. 
Summary 
the conclusions (stated a t  the beginning of the article) reveal, the 
total budget approach to the Nebraska educational finance system provides 
rather surprising results. At  least, they are surprising if one believes that 
Nebraska's school finance conforms to  the community and judicial deci- 
sions which declare that educational expenditures should not grow as 
district wealth increases. The Nebraska state structure produces funds for 
the wealthy districts, as measured by assessed valuation, by taxing the 
poor ones. 
It is also apparent that local funding further exaggerates the inequities 
established by the state system. 
While the inequities of Nebraska school finance should be of special 
interest to  Nebraskans, the primary contribution of this article is the 
methodology of how to  proceed in making equity studies, and the result- 
ing formula in Table 1 to  which other algorithms can be applied. Such 
algorithms need to  be applied and empirical tests made t o  improve the 
results found here. The conclusions found above derive from the method- 
ology, and empirical testing should be the next step. 
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